Pace Environmental Law Review Online Companion
Volume 7
Issue 1 Twenty-Eighth Annual Jeffrey G. Miller
Pace National Environmental Law Moot Court
Competition

Article 4

February 2016

Measuring Brief (Sylvanergy)
Josh Fortenbery
Lewis & Clark Law School

Cameron Jimmo
Lewis & Clark Law School

Kathryn Roberts
Lewis & Clark Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural
Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Josh Fortenbery, Cameron Jimmo, and Kathryn Roberts, Measuring Brief (Sylvanergy), 7 Pace
Envtl. L. Rev. Online Companion 99 (2016)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review Online Companion by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL
JEFFREY G. MILLER PACE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
Measuring Brief*
LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCHOOL
JOSH FORTENBERY, CAMERON JIMMO, KATHRYN ROBERTS
Docket Nos. 14-000123 and 14-000124
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
SYLVANERGY, L.L.C.,
Petitioner,
v.
SHANEY GRANGER, in her official capacity as Regional
Administrator for Region XIII of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondent,
and
SAVE OUR CLIMATE, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
SHANEY GRANGER, in her official capacity as Regional
Administrator for Region XIII of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondent.
ON CONSOLIDATED PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF A
FINAL ORDER OF THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
Brief of SYLVANERGY, L.L.C., Petitioner
*

This brief has been reprinted in its original format. Please note that the Table of
Authorities and Table of Contents for this brief have been omitted.

99

1

100 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 7

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under section 307(b) of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012), to review the final
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action issuing a
Prevention of Significant Deterioration permit to Sylvanergy,
L.L.C. This Court also has jurisdiction to review all intermediate
and interlocutory decisions relevant to EPA's final action. 5
U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (providing that an "intermediate agency
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the
review of the final agency action").

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

This Court has jurisdiction to review final Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits, as well as intermediate
decisions made during the PSD permitting process. Sylvanergy,
L.L.C. (Sylvanergy) timely petitioned this court for review of the
PSD permit issued by New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB).
Does this Court have jurisdiction to review NUARB's
interlocutory decision to deny Sylvanergy's request for a NonApplicability Determination?
Sylvanergy proposed a biomass-fired electricity generation
facility that contains only two 60 MMBtu/hour fossil fuel start-up
burners. Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), a fossil fuel-fired steam
electric plant is regulated under the PSD program if it has a heat
input of more than 250 MMBtu/hour. Did NUARB err in
classifying the Sylvanergy facility as a fossil fuel-fired plant?
Because Sylvanergy's proposed facility is not one of the 28
specified sources under CAA section 165, it is only subject to PSD
review if it emits more than 250 tons per year(tpy) of carbon
monoxide (CO). Locally imposed, binding output restrictions
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prevent the proposed facility from emitting any more than 190
tpy of CO. Did NUARB err in determining that the proposed
facility's CO emissions triggered PSD review?
An EPA rule deferring regulation of biogenic carbon dioxide
emissions was in effect at the time NUARB issued Sylvanergy's
PSD permit. EPA has consistently recognized that biomass-fired
electricity generation can be carbon neutral. Did NUARB err in
subjecting Sylvanergy's proposed facility to PSD review for
greenhouse gas emissions?
In step one of a best available control technology (BACT)
determination, the permit issuer does not consider those control
technologies that would impermissibly redefine the permit
applicant's proposed source. NUARB determined that requiring
Sylvanergy to gasify wood and burn gas, rather than burn wood,
would redefine the proposed facility. Was NUARB's
determination reasonable?
Although BACT traditionally involves onsite control
technologies, NUARB ultimately determined that BACT for
Sylvanergy's proposed facility involvespurchasing and managing
25,000 hectares of forested land on a separate piece of property.
Did NUARB err by considering "beyond-the-fence" measures in
its BACT determination?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a petition to review the grant of a Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit to Sylvanergy, L.L.C.
(Sylvanergy). R. 4. Sylvanergy seeks to construct a new biomassfired electricity generation and wood pellet production facility in
Forestdale, New Union. R. 5. New Union Air Resources Board
(NUARB) found that two start-up burners using fossil fuels
rendered Sylvanergy's proposed biomass-fired facility a "fossilfuel facility" subject to a lower threshold for emissions. R. 6.

3
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Further, NUARBdetermined it would be impermissible to
consider local operational controls in assessing the facility's
potential to emit pollutants. Id. Therefore, NUARB denied
Sylvanergy's request for a Non-Applicability Determination
(NAD) and found that Sylvanergy's facility is a "major emitting
facility" subject to PSD review. Id.During its PSD review,
NUARB adopted a Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Sylvanergy's proposed
facility. Id.
Petitions for review of the NUARB decisions were timely filed
with the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) by both Sylvanergy
and Save Our Climate, Inc. (SOC), an environmental non-profit
corporation. R. 4. Sylvanergy sought review of the NAD denial,
the applicability of PSD review for biomass facilities, and the
imposition of the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for GHG
emissions. R. 7. SOC challenged the denial of a wood gasification
and partial carbon capture and storage as BACT. Id. The EAB
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review the NAD denial, as it
held that action did not constitute a "PSD final permit decision."
R. 8. The EAB further determined that use of biofuels alone does
not constitute BACT, R. 11; that NUARB properly excluded wood
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage from its
BACT analysis, R. 13; and that NUARB reasonably imposed the
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT. R. 12.Sylvanergy timely filed
this petition for review of the EAB decision. R. 1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Sylvanergy, L.L.C. (Sylvanergy) proposed to build the
Forestdale Biomass Facility—a biomass-fired electricity
generation facility—approximately 2 km from the center of
Forestdale, New Union. R. 5. Sylvanergy designed the Forestdale
Biomass Facility to include a biomass-fired electricity generation
unit with a capacity of 40 megawatts, as well as a wood pellet fuel
production plant. Id. The planned 500 million British thermal
units per hour (MMBtu/hour) electricity generation unit would
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primarily use a wood-fired boiler, and two ultra-low sulfur diesel
start-up burners would be used to start the boiler. Id.
The designed facility initially had a potential to emit 350,000
tons per year (tpy) of greenhouse gases (GHGs) at full capacity,
and 255 tpy of carbon monoxide (CO) at 96% operational capacity.
Id. However, when Village of Forestdale granted site approval for
the proposed facility, it conditioned its approval upon the facility
operating at 75% capacity, or 6,500 hours annually. Id. This
operational restriction mitigates the impact of log trucks
transporting lumber through Forestdale for processing at
Sylvanergy's proposed facility. Id. The Village of Forestdale
incorporated the operational restriction into the site plan, and it
is enforceable by the Forestdale Building Inspector. Id. Based on
these restricted operating conditions, the facility has the
potential to emit no more than 190 tpy of CO, as well as lesser
amounts of other criteria pollutants. Id.Despite the enforceable
emissions limitation, New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB)
determined that Sylvanergy requires a Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) permit in order to operate the Forestdale
Biomass Facility. R. 6. Further, NUARB decided to conduct PSD
review for GHG emissions over Sylvanergy's objection. Id.
After determining that PSD review applied to GHG
emissions, NUARB conducted a top-down approach to determine
what should be implemented as Best Available Control
Technology (BACT) for GHG emissions. Id. NUARB considered
carbon capture and storage, but determined that this technology
is not currently available for biomass combustion. Id. NUARB
next considered alternative fuels like natural gas, as well as wood
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage. R. 7. Both
options were rejected as impermissible redefinitions of the source.
Id. Finally, NUARB considered a Sustainable Forest Plan that
involves management of a separate 25,000 hectare reforestation
area. Id. NUARB ultimately adopted the Sustainable Forest Plan
as BACT, requiring Sylvanergy to purchase 25,000 hectares of
land outside of the Forestdale Biomass Facility property, at an
estimated cost of $10 million. R. 7.

5
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Administrator's decision must be vacated if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2012); see alsoAlaska Dept. of Envtl.
Conservation v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004)
(indicating APA standard of review applies to review of
Prevention of Significant Deterioration permit where Clean Air
Act sections do not specify the review standard).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Sylvanergy, L.L.C. (Sylvanergy) timely petitioned this Court
to review a final Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
permit issued by New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB).
Upon review of that final agency action, this Court has
jurisdiction to review all intermediate decisions leading to the
PSD permit, including NUARB's threshold decision that PSD
review applies to the Forestdale Biomass Facility. Therefore, this
Court should grant review of NUARB's Non-Applicability
Determination (NAD) and find that NUARB impermissibly
subjected Sylvanergy's proposed facility to PSD review.
NUARB erred by concluding thatthe Forestdale Biomass
Facility is a "major emitting facility" subject to PSD regulation.
Sylvanergy's proposed facility is not a listed source subject to the
100 ton per year (tpy) emissions threshold because it is not fossil
fuel-fired. Further, the facility does not have the potential to emit
more than 250 tpy of any relevant pollutant because the Village
of Forestdale imposed practical and enforceable operational
controls that lower the facility's emissions potential below the
statutory threshold. Thus, this Court should remand to NUARB
to reconsider Sylvanergy's NAD request in light of the locally
imposed operational restrictions.
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NUARB also erroneously subjected the Forestdale Biomass
Facility to PSD review for greenhouse gases (GHGs). At the time
NUARB issued Sylvanergy's PSD permit, it arbitrarily failed to
consider an EPA regulation deferring PSD review of biogenic
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions until a later date. In addition,
EPA has consistently acknowledged the potential of biomass-fired
electricity generation to provide carbon-neutral renewable
energy. As such, EPA has continuously asserted that it would like
to defer regulation of biogenic CO2 emissions until it can be
certain that there is a regulatory benefit. Subjecting Sylvanergy's
proposed facility to PSD review for GHGs represented an
irrational departure from EPA's consistent policy position.
Therefore, this Court should vacate NUARB's decision to subject
Sylvanergy's proposed facility to PSD review as arbitrary and
capricious.
Finally, NUARB erred in determining the best available
control technology (BACT) for the Forestdale Biomass Facility. As
a threshold matter, the agency reasonably found that wood
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage redefined the
source, as it would substantially change the design of
Sylvanergy's proposed facility. However, NUARB impermissibly
considered "beyond-the-fence" measures in identifying the
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT, as BACT traditionally involves
onsite control technologies more readily understood as
technological.Therefore, if this Court finds that the Forestdale
Biomass Facility is subject to PSD review, it should nevertheless
remand the PSD permit to NUARB for a proper BACT
determination.

7
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ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW
THE NON-APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION
BECAUSE THAT INTERLOCUTORY DECISION
ONLY BECAME REVIEWABLE AFTER
SYLVANERGY EXHAUSTED ALL
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB) denied
Sylvanergy's request for a Non-Applicability Determination
(NAD) as an intermediate step in the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) permitting process. This Court has
jurisdiction to review all subsidiary decisions related to issuance
of the PSD permit now that Sylvanergy has exhausted its
administrative remedies. Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act
(CAA) confers jurisdiction on the circuit courts of appeals to
review several specific actions of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, in addition to "any other
final action of the Administrator under this chapter . . . which is
locally or regionally applicable." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012).
Under section 307(b), parties must file petitions for review
"within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation,
approval, or action appears in the Federal Register." Id.
Here, the denial of Sylvanergy's NAD request—thereby
subjecting the Forestdale Biomass Facility to PSD review—did
not constitute a final agency action for which Sylvanergy had to
seek judicial review within sixty days.1 Instead, the sixty day
limitation period began after the Environmental Appeals Board
(EAB) reached its final decision and the Regional Administrator
published the PSD permit in the Federal Register, rendering the
agency action "final" pursuant to EPA regulations. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.19(l)(2) (2014) (providing that a final action on a PSD
permit does not occur until all administrative remedies are
1

A section 165 imposes best available control technology requirements on facilities
subject to PSD review. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2012).
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exhausted); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 773 F.2d
375, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a sixty day limitations
period did not begin to run until after an order was published in
the Federal Register, rendering that order effective). Sylvanergy
timely petitioned this Court for review of the EAB decision. R. 1.
While reviewing that final agency action, this Court has
jurisdiction to review all intermediate decisions reached before
EPA published the final PSD permit. See 5 U.S.C. § 704
(providing that courts have jurisdiction to review interlocutory
decisions upon review of a final agency action).
A. The denial of the NAD request was an
intermediate step in the PSD permitting process,
not a final agency action, and provided an
insufficient basis for judicial review until an
adequate factual record was developed during
PSD permitting.
The term "final action . . . bears the same meaning in §
307(b)(1) that it does under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 704." Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001). Thus, for an action to be reviewable
under section 307(b) it must at least satisfy the following APA
criteria for finality: "First, the action must mark the
'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process—it must
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second,
the action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have been
determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will flow.'"
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (internal citations
omitted). This does not mean that interlocutory actions such as
NUARB's NAD decision are unreviewable; instead, "[a]
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling
not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the
final agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). Because the NAD
decision was an aspect of the PSD permitting process, it became
reviewable as part of that final agency action when the Regional
Administrator published the final PSD permit in the Federal
Register.
Multiple circuits have recognized that agency deliberations
are ongoing until the agency takes action on a permit application,

9
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thus providing its final position as to what standards and controls
should apply to a proposed facility. See Ocean Cty. Landfill Corp.
v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 631 F.3d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that "a new permit, not intermediate decisions, will
mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking
process"); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
225 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
consummation of agency decision making "cannot occur before the
[state agency] has acted on the permit application). Threshold
determinations merely indicating that further agency action is
required—like deciding that PSD review should apply to a
proposed facility—cannot be reviewed immediately. See Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232,
241 (1980) (finding an agency determination that adjudicatory
proceedings were merited did not represent a final agency
decision, only a threshold opinion).
In Ocean County Landfill, the Third Circuit considered a
challenge to an EPA determination that two facilities were under
"common control," which required reopening and reissuing the
operating permits of each facility to reflect their status as a single
source. 631 F.3d at 654. Although EPA characterized its decision
as "final," the Third Circuit did not have jurisdiction to review the
common control determination because it "was only one,
intermediate, step in the permitting process." Id. at 655. The
court also found it significant that EPA's decision did not require
immediate compliance, but merely instructed a facility to begin
the permitting process. Id.at 656. Thus, in Ocean County
Landfill, determining that a certain permit was required did not
represent the culmination of the agency's decision-making
process, because drafting and commenting on a permit can expose
new facts and allow the agency to change position. Id. at 655.
Similarly, NUARB's rejection of Sylvanergy's NAD request
was an interlocutory decision that only informed Sylvanergy of
the agency's opinion that a particular permit would be required
for a proposed facility. As the court made clear in Ocean County
Landfill, requiring a party to begin permitting procedures does
not represent a reviewable final agency action because the factfinding involved in drafting a permit and soliciting comments will
provide a court with the information necessary to resolve all
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disputes related to a facility in a single proceeding. Id. at 656
(explaining that the court's "ability to decide the issue would
benefit greatly from additional facts, most importantly the terms
of a new permit and whether and/or how it will harm [the
permitee]"). In addition, the denial of the NAD request merely
alerted Sylvanergy of its preexisting obligations under the CAA,
and did not impose any new legal obligations or penalties. As the
Seventh Circuit has recognized, a decision is not reviewable as a
final agency action when it "has no legal force except to impose
upon [a party] the already-existing burden of complying with the
CAA and its implementing regulations." Acker v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 290 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2002). Therefore, because the
NAD decision did not represent the consummation of the agency's
permitting process and did not impose any new penalties, this
Court now has jurisdiction to review that decision as an
intermediate part of the PSD permitting process.
Although the EAB decision cites Puerto Rican Cement Co. v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1989),for the
proposition that the denial of an NAD request is subject to
immediate review in the courts of appeals, R. 8, that case is
inapposite. In Puerto Rican Cement, the First Circuit recognized
that the denial of an NAD was analogous to a decision of the
Federal Trade Commission to initiate costly proceedings against
a company, which the Supreme Court held not to be a final
agency action. 889 F.2d at 295 (citing Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980)). However, in finding
that it had jurisdiction, the First Circuit decided to "apply the
exception and not the rule," in light of the fact that EPA did not
contest jurisdiction, and thus waived all exhaustion
requirements. Id. at 295–96. Here, unlike in Puerto Rican
Cement, EPA did not consent to interlocutory judicial review after
the NAD decision. Therefore this Court should apply the rule and
not the exception by reviewing NUARB's NAD denial as a
component of the final PSD permit.
B. No PSD decisions are reviewable under section
307(b) until all administrative remedies are
exhausted, and thus even if the NAD decision
otherwise satisfies the test for a "final agency

11
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action," it is only now reviewable after the EAB
issued its decision.
In addition to satisfying the Supreme Court's test for finality,
a party seeking judicial review of an agency action must meet the
separate but related requirement of exhausting all administrative
remedies. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41,
50–51 (1938) (explaining that "no one is entitled to judicial relief
for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted"). Although finality
and exhaustion are similar jurisdictional prerequisites, the two
concepts "are not identical . . . no matter how often they
converge." Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 669
F.2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1982). Finality generally refers to the
conclusion of the agency's decision-making process, while
exhaustion concerns the steps a litigant must take before seeking
judicial review of an agency action. Id.
EPA regulations provide that PSD permit decisions only
become final actions once a permit applicant has exhausted all
administrative remedies. 40 C.F.R.§ 124.19(l)(2) (2014) ("For
purposes of judicial review under the appropriate Act, final
agency action on a . . . PSD permit occurs when agency review
procedures under this section are exhausted and the Regional
Administrator subsequently issues a final permit decision under
this paragraph."). Further, the CAA regulations indicate that
reviewable PSD permit decisions include both specific permit
conditions, as well as the threshold decision to issue a permit. See
id. § 124.13 (describing the issues petitioners must raise during
commenting in order to later seek EAB review, including
challenges to "any condition of a draft permit" and the decision to
"prepare a draft permit"). Therefore, so long as a permittee
expresses disagreement with the denial of an NAD during public
commenting, that issue can later be raised on appeal to the EAB.
See id. § 124.19(a)(4)(ii) (providing that the EAB has jurisdiction
to review issues raised by petitioners during a public comment
period to the extent required by 40 C.F.R § 124.13, which
contemplates review of the decision that a facility needs a PSD
permit). Here, NUARB's denial of Sylvanergy's NAD request was
reviewable on appeal to the EAB as part of the PSD permitting
process, and only became a final agency action for the purposes of
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section 307(b) review once the EAB issued its decision and the
Regional Administrator published the final PSD permit. Id. §
124.19(l)(2) (providing that agency actions are not final until a
party exhausts administrative remedies by seeking EAB review).
Now that the agency action is final under the terms of the CAA
and all administrative remedies have been exhausted, this Court
has jurisdiction to review all intermediate and subsidiary
decisions involved in issuing the PSD permit, including the
threshold decision that a PSD permit is necessary for the
Forestdale Biomass Facility.
II. THE FORESTDALE BIOMASS FACILITY IS NOT
SUBJECT TO THE 100 TPY THRESHOLD
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT MEET EPA'S
DEFINITION OF A FOSSIL FUEL-FIRED
FACILITY.
Sylvanergy's proposed facility is subject to the 100 tpy
threshold for PSD review only if it qualifies as one of 28
enumerated sources, including either a "fossil-fuel fired steam
electric plant" or a "fossil-fuel boiler." See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1)
(2012) (defining 'major emitting facility' for PSD regulation). The
CAA imposes PSD requirements on fossil fuel facilities that have
a heat input of greater than 250 million British thermal units per
hour (MMBtu/hour). Id.NUARB erred in characterizing the
Forestdale Biomass Facility as a fossil fuel source subject to the
100 tpy threshold for two reasons. First, Sylvanergy's plant
design involves a biomass-fired electricity generation unit, not a
fossil fuel-fired source. R. 5. Second, even if classified as a fossilfuel source, the Forestdale Biomass Facility nonetheless fails to
meet the heat input criteria of the CAA because its two ultra-low
sulfur diesel (ULSD) start-up burners do not have the capacity to
generate more than 120 MMBtu/hour.2Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1)
(listing heat input criteria for fossil fuel sources). Thereforethis
Court should reverse NUARB's findingthat the Forestdale
Biomass Facility is fossil-fuel source.
2. The Forestdale Biomass Facility uses two 60 MMBtu/hour ULSD start-up
burners. R. 5. The two burners function as part of the same electricity
generation unit, and are counted together for purposes of determining heat
input.

13
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A. The Forestdale Biomass Facility is a biomass
source, not a fossil fuel source.
Biomass is not considered a fossil fuel for PSD purposes. See
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP
MANUAL: PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND
NONATTAINMENT AREA PERMITTING A-22 to A-23 (Draft, 1990)
[hereinafter "NSR MANUAL"]. EPA distinguishes between fossil
fuel fired steam electric plants and biomass facilities, finding that
if a "boiler were designed and permitted to burn wood only, it
would not be classified as one of the 28 PSD sources and would
instead be subject to the 250 tpy threshold." Id.
Here, the Forestdale Biomass Facility combines a wood pellet
production plant with a wood-fired boiler capable of generating
steam-based electricity by combusting biomass. R. 5. NUARB
considered the plant "fossil-fuel fired" because the design utilizes
ULSD ignition sources to start the biomass boiler. Id.; R. 6.
However, the use of some fossil fuels does not render the facility a
fossil fuel plant. The purpose of Sylvanergy's proposed facility is
electricity generation, which is done by processing wood into
pellets, combusting the wood pellets into steam and using steam
to power a generator. R. 5. Fossil fuels comprise a single function
in the chain, starting the boiler used for biomass combustion.
This single function is not sufficient to classify the entire
plant as a fossil fuel source because courts look to a facility's
primary activity to discern the source designation. LaFleur v.
Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 275 (2d Cir. 2002); see also NSR MANUAL
at A-2 (describing the 'primary activity' test). In LaFleur, the
court upheld a determination that a new source designed to both
produce chemicals and process municipal waste was not subject
to the 100 tpy threshold as a "chemical processing plant."
LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 256. Although chemical production was a
part of the process, the Second Circuit upheld EPA's
determination that the plant was primarily a municipal waste
facility because that part of the facility's operations generated the
majority of its revenue and influenced the design and location of
the plant. Id. at 276.
A similar analysis applies to the Forestdale Biomass Facility.
The facility's business model and design is centered around
biomass, as evidenced by its wood pellet production plant, as well
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as its location in the aptly-named Forestdale, a well-forested
region. R.7, 11. Analogous to the LaFleur court's comparison of
revenue, here the Court can look at the input levels for each type
of fuel to determine the nature of Sylvanergy's proposed facility.
The biomass combustion has a heat input of 380 MMBtu/hour
while the ULSD start-up burners comprise only 120
MMBtu/hour, less than one quarter of the facility's total input. R.
5. Such a small component part falls well short of constituting the
primary activity of the proposed facility. Indeed, NUARB found
that Sylvanergy's "primary reliance" would be on wood biomass
and not fossil fuels. R. 6.Therefore, the NUARB erred in
concluding that the Forestdale Biomass Facility is a fossil fuelfired source.
B. The Forestdale Biomass Facility's fossil fuel heat
input is not sufficient to qualify as one of the listed
sources subject to the 100 tpy threshold.
Under the CAA, a fossil fuel source is only subject to the PSD
program if it has a heat input of more than 250 MMBtu/hour. 42
U.S.C. § 7479(a)(1). The Forestdale Biomass Facility's two ULSD
start-up burners do not have the capacity to generate more than
120 MMBtu/hour. R. 5. Thus, NUARB erred in determining that
the proposed facility is subject to the PSD program as a fossil fuel
source.
Save Our Climate, Inc. (SOC) contends that the 76% of heat
generated by biomass should be considered in determining if the
facility is an eligible fossil fuel source. Even EPA acknowledges
that this represents an improper reading of the statute, as
evidenced by EPA's litigation position in this action. See R. 2. In
prior instances, EPA has noted that where a facility produces
electricity through both biomass and fossil fuels, only the heat
input of the fossil fuels is used to determine if the source meets
the statutory threshold. See In re Air Quality Permit No. 3434,
N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., No. 07-04(A), 5 (2007).3 Further, of
3. Available at
https://www.env.nm.gov/aqb/permit/documents/NSR_3434_Order_and_
Statement_of_Reasons_for_Granting_Permit.pdf (overturning a permit denial
for biomass plant with fossil-fuel start-up burners in part on EPA’s
interpretation that source would not be subject to 100 tpy threshold).
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all the enumerated PSD sources, only fossil fuel sources have a
heat input specification. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). This suggests that
Congress was not concerned with heat input generally, but with
fossil fuel-derived heat input specifically. Therefore, it would
make sense to calculate the fossil-fuel heat input specifically
rather than the facility-wide heat input in defining the source.
Because Congress only specified a heat input threshold for fossil
fuels, it is untenable to interpret the statute as requiring
measurement of facility-wide heat input. Accordingly, this Court
should reverse the finding of NUARB that the Forestdale
Biomass Facility is a fossil fuel source subject to the 100 tpy
threshold.
III. THE FORESTDALE BIOMASS FACILITY DOES
NOT HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO EMIT MORE
THAN 250 TPY OF ANY RELEVANT POLLUTANT
BECAUSE LOCALLY IMPOSED AND
ENFORCEABLE RESTRICTIONS LOWER THE
FACILITY'S EMISSIONS BELOW THE
THRESHOLD.
Sources that are not specifically listed under section 169(1)
are only subject to PSD review if the source has the potential to
emit greater than 250 tpy of a relevant pollutant. 42 U.S.C. §
7479(1). "Potential to emit" is not defined by statute. Id. Courts
have stated that EPA must take emission controls into account
when calculating potential to emit. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
636 F.2d 323, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Forestdale Biomass
Facility's potential to emit does not exceed the 250 tpy threshold
because it is subject to locally imposed emission controls. R. 5.
NUARB erred in applying vacated regulations and an
inapplicable Interim Policy to reject the properly calculated
potential to emit, which includes the locally enforced operating
conditions. This Court should reverse NUARB's decision finding
that the Forestdale Biomass Facility is a "major emitting facility."
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A. NUARB erred in applying EPA's "federally
enforceable" regulatory requirement, which is no
longer good law.
In refusing to consider locally-enforced controls that restrict
the operational capacity of the Forestdale Biomass Facility,
NUARB relied on an EPA regulation that requires controls to be
"federally enforceable." R. 6; 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4) (2014).
However, this regulation is no longer valid in the wake of two
D.C. Circuit decisions invalidating the regulations.4See Nat'l
Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency., 59 F.3d 1351, 1364
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 70
F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In National Mining, the court clarified
that potential to emit, in the section 112 program regulations,
cannot be reasonably read to include only federally enforced
controls.59 F.3d at 1364. The court noted that potential to emit
plainly refers to non-voluntary, effective, and practical controls,
but rejected EPA's "rather strained interpretation of the statute."
Id. In Chemical Manufacturer's, the court addressed the same
"federally enforceable" language, this time under the New Source
Review regulations. 70 F.3d at 637. The court vacated the rule in
light of the "similar challenge" that was addressed in National
Mining.5Id. EPA did not appeal the rulings. NUARB
impermissibly relied on these regulations in refusing to count the
Forestdale Biomass Facility's locally enforceable controls when
calculating its potential to emit.
B. EPA's Interim Policy is not applicable to
Sylvanergy or entitled to deference.
In light of these decisions, EPA issued an Interim Policy
memo in January 1996 to address federal enforceability
requirements. Memorandum from John S. Sietz, Director, Office
4. As nationally applicable, these regulations may only be challenged in the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Decisions are given
nation-wide effect. See, e.g. U.S. v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1357
(5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing holding of National Mining).
5. Although EPA has declined to remove the vacated regulations from the
CFR, they have no legal effect. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 70 F.3d at 637; Action on
Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(defining “vacate”).
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of Air Quality Planning and Standards, and Robert I Van
Heuvelen, Director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement to Regional
Offices, 5 (Jan. 22, 1996) [hereinafter "Interim Policy"]. The
Interim Policy stated that in the PSD context "the term 'federally
enforceable' should now be read to mean 'federally enforceable or
legally and practicably enforceable by a state or local air pollution
control agency.'" Id. However, this position is inconsistent with
the ruling in Chemical Manufacturer's and the Interim Policy has
no legal application to Sylvanergy's NAD.
Although EPA interprets the D.C. Circuit's decision as
vacating "the PSD/NSR federal enforceability requirement," this
misstates the court's holding. Interim Policy at 4. The petitioners
challenged "regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency
that define the term'potential to emit'" and the Court held that
"the regulations are vacated." Chem. Mfrs., 70 F.3d at 637
(emphasis added).Thus, the regulatory definition of "potential to
emit," and not merely the "federally enforceable" requirement
was vacated. EPA has declined to promulgate a new definition of
"potential to emit" for the past nineteen years. As such, only the
statutory text is binding for PSD determinations. The term
"federally enforceable" does not appear in the statute, it appears
only in the now-vacated regulations. Chem. Mfrs., 70 F.3d at 637;
42 U.S.C. § 7479 (defining 'major source'). The Interim Policy
does not purport to interpret "potential to emit," which is the
governing term for review of Sylvanergy's NAD request.
Because EPA is interpreting neither the statute nor a valid
regulation, and the Interim Policy was not promulgated under
notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is entitled to Skidmore
deference at best. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944). Non-legislative agency pronouncements are "entitled to
respect" under Skidmore to the extent they have the "power to
persuade." Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006), quoting
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Factors indicating the weight given to
such interpretations include the "thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
140. The Interim Policy was intended to be a temporary policy,
until supplanted by regulations that would give full consideration
to the appropriate statutory requirements. Interim Policy at 2–3.
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The agency gave no explanation for the requirement that a state
or local air pollution control agency enforce any emissions
limitations. Id. at 3. Further, requiring enforcement by an air
pollution control agency has no basis in either the statutory
language or the D.C. Circuit opinion rejecting the regulation. See
Nat'l Mining, 59 F.3d at 1362. Finally, as the D.C. Circuit noted,
the agency's position on requiring federally enforceable controls
has varied widely. Id. EPA's Interim Policy is therefore
unpersuasive and should be rejected under Skidmore.
C. NUARB's assessmentof the Forestdale Biomass
Facility'spotential to emit was arbitrary and
capricious because it failed to consider locallyimposed operational restrictions.
NUARB erred in failing to consider the Village of
Forestdale's operational restrictions in assessing the Forestdale
Biomass Facility'spotential to emit criteria pollutants. National
Mining—cited as the rationale for vacatur of the "potential to
emit" regulations in the PSD context—provides guidance for
assessing the adequacy of controls limiting a source's potential to
emit. 59 F.3d at 1362. There, the D.C. Circuit established that
under the plain meaning of "potential to emit," emissions controls
must only be effective and non-voluntary. Id. According to this
reasoning, the Forestdale Biomass Facility'scalculated potential
to emit must include the operational limits that are documented
in the site approval plan and enforceable by regulatory personnel.
R. 5. Operational limits are a well-established means of
controlling emissions, which EPA has often cited as exemplary
means to limit emissions. See, e.g., Requirements for Preparation,
Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and
Promulgation of Implementation Plans 48 Fed. Reg. 38,742,
38,747 (proposed Aug. 25, 1983) (citing limit on hours as example
of emission limit); NSR MANUAL at A-1 (listing restrictions on
hours of operations as condition which limits potential to emit).
Because the Village of Forestdale's operational restrictions satisfy
the D.C. Circuit's criteria for an effective emissions limitation,
NUARB erroneously concluded that the Forestdale Biomass
Facilityhas the potential to emit more than 250 tpy of CO.
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Accordingly, this Court should reverse the denial of Sylvanergy's
NAD request.
IV. BIOMASS-FUELED FACILITIES ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO PSD REVIEW FOR GHG
EMISSIONS, BECAUSE SUCH FACILITIES ARE
CARBON NEUTRAL AND EPA HAS
CONSISTENTLY RECOGNIZED A PSD
EXEMPTION FOR BIOGENIC CARBON DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS.
EPA has consistently recognized that biogenic carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions do not pose the same risks to the planet as
emissions from fossil fuel-fired facilities, and the agency should
continue its practice of exempting biomass facilities from PSD
review for CO2 because such facilities are carbon neutral. See,
e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed.
Reg. 34,830, 34,843–44 n.30 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (describing biomass as a form of
"renewable energy" akin to wind or solar energy).After the
Supreme Court determined that greenhouse gases (GHGs) qualify
as a "pollutant" under the CAA, Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007), EPA made a finding that
GHGs in the atmosphere endanger public health and welfare,
leading to regulation of GHG emissions from motor vehicles.
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
66,496, 66,497 (December 15, 2009). Shortly after the
endangerment finding, EPA promulgated a "Tailoring Rule" that
specified the thresholds at which new facilities would be subject
to PSD review for GHGs, indicating that PSD regulation of GHGs
would begin in January, 2011. See Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31,514, 31,523 (June 3, 2010).
However, EPA immediately recognized that GHG emissions
from biomass facilities cannot be treated in the same manner as
GHG emissions from fossil fuel-fired plants, and one month after
promulgating the Tailoring Rule, EPA issued a Call for
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Information regarding the best means of accounting for biogenic
GHG emissions. See 75 Fed. Reg. 41,173 (July 15, 2010). In
response to comments received during the Call for Information
and a separate petition stressing that the combustion of biomass
does not raise net atmospheric levels of GHGs, EPA decided to
defer regulation of GHGs under the PSD program until July 20,
2014, so it could take more time to study the issue. Deferral for
CO2 Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V
Programs (Deferral Rule), 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 (July 20, 2011).
The Deferral Rule recognizes the marginal benefit of regulating
biogenic GHG emissions and acknowledges that biomass facilities
are potentially carbon neutral. Id. at 43,492.
During the deferral period, EPA developed a framework for
analyzing biogenic GHG emissions. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING BIOGENIC CO2 EMISSIONS FROM
STATIONARY SOURCES (2011). Although this framework indicates
that carbon neutrality cannot be assumed in all cases, it also
states that "biogenic CO2 emissions from stationary sources will
not inevitably result in an increased net flux of biogenic CO2 to
the atmosphere within a policy-relevant time scale- unlike CO2
emissions from combustion of fossil fuels." Id. at 3, 6. This is
because biomass fuels are able to sequester carbon from the
Earth's atmosphere over a short period of time, and the biogenic
CO2 emissions resulting from combustion are a part of the
natural carbon cycle. Id. at 1. The logic of EPA's framework—
which explains how regulators can determine whether a biomass
facility might have a net impact on atmospheric CO2 levels—
indicates that a facility should not automatically be subject to
PSD review for biogenic CO2 emissions. Id. Instead, a biomass
facility should only be subject to technology-based requirements if
EPA determines that it will increase net atmospheric levels of
GHGs. Id. In addition, EPA recognizes that the use of biomass is
a potential means of reducing net GHG emissions. See 79 Fed.
Reg. at 34,923 (listing the use of biomass fuel as a "potential
emission reduction measure").
Even if EPA eventually determines that biogenic GHG
emissions are not categorically exempt from PSD review, NUARB
impermissibly subjected the Forestdale Biomass Facility to PSD

21

120 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 7

review for GHGs. At the time the permit was issued the Deferral
Rule was still legally in effect and imposing PSD requirements on
the GHG emissions at a biomass facility represented an irrational
departure from past agency practice. Therefore, NUARB's
decision to subject the Forestdale Biomass Facilityto PSD review
for CO2 should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious.
A. The Deferral Rule was legally in effect when
NUARB issued the permit, and agencies are
required to apply whatever law is controlling at
the time a permit is issued.
The EAB cites Center for Biological Diversity(CBD) v.
EPA,722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013), for the proposition that the
D.C. Circuit invalidated the Deferral Rule before Sylvanergy's
PSD permit was issued. R. 8. However, though the D.C. Circuit
asserted that EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to regulate all
emissions of GHGs under the PSD program and determined that
the Deferral Rule should be invalidated, 722 F.3d at 412, the
court never issued a mandate officially vacating the rule. See In
re Sierra Pac. Indus. (Anderson Processing Facility), PSD Appeal
Nos. 13-01 to 13-04, 2013 WL 3791510, at *42 (EAB 2013)
(indicating that "[t]he Court's judgment [vacating the Deferral
Rule] will not become final and effective until such time as it
issues a 'mandate'"). Because the Deferral Rule was never
officially vacated and did not expire on its own terms until July
20, 2014, that rule was still legally in effect when Sylvanergy's
PSD permit was issued on June 12, 2014. R. 4. Further, EPA
itself acknowledged that the Deferral Rule remained valid for the
entire three year deferral period, indicating that the agency
considered the rule to be in effect at the time Sylvanergy's permit
was issued. Memorandum from Janet McCabe, EPA Office of Air
and Radiation, to Regional Administrators, Next Steps and
Preliminary Views on the Application of Clean Air Act Permitting
Programs to Greenhouse Gases, at 6 (July 24, 2014). EPA must
apply whatever law is controlling at the time a permit is issued,
and it was therefore required to give effect to the Deferral Rule
and exempt the Forestdale Biomass Facility from PSD review for
GHGs. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 762 F.3d 971,
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980 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that "EPA is bound to enforce
administrative guidelines in effect when it takes final action").
In addition, the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency(UARG),
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), undermines the reasoning of the CBD
opinion. The CBD court did not address "whether the agency has
authority under the Clean Air Act to permanently exempt
biogenic carbon dioxide sources from the PSD permitting
program." 722 F.3d at 412. Rather, the court assumed that EPA
had a nondiscretionary duty to regulate biogenic GHG emissions
under the CAA, and held that the Deferral Rule did not articulate
a reasonable basis for avoiding a statutory mandate. Id. at 408–
09, 412. In UARG,the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
EPA was compelled to regulate GHGs under the PSD program,
and indicated that the agency could plausibly interpret the
phrase "any air pollutant" in the PSD context to "exclude those
atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in
such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically
transform those programs and render them unworkable as
written." 134 S.Ct. at 2442. Thus, the Supreme Court found the
CAA ambiguous with regard to PSD review of GHG emissions, a
conclusion that permits EPA to permanently exempt biogenic
GHG emissions from PSD review if it so chooses, and certainly
allows the agency to defer regulation in light of scientific
uncertainty as to whether biomass facilities have any net effect
on atmospheric levels of GHGs. Because the agency chose to defer
regulation of biogenic CO2 emissions until after July 20, 2014, it
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in subjecting the Forestdale
Biomass Facilityto PSD review for CO2 emissions in the permit
issued on June 12, 2014.
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B. Even if the D.C. Circuit had invalidated the
Deferral Rule, subjecting Sylvanergy to PSD
review for biogenic GHG emissions was arbitrary
and capricious because such action represented an
irrational departure from EPA's stated policy
position.
Even if the D.C. Circuit had issued a mandate vacating the
deferral rule, EPA's decision to require PSD review of GHGs at
the Forestdale Biomass Facilityrepresented an irrational
departure from the agency's stated policy position and must be
set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court has
stated:
Though the agency's discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it
announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of
adjudication—a general policy by which its exercise of discretion
will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as
opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that
must be overturned as "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
discretion."

Immigration &Naturalization Serv. v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S.
26, 32 (1996). Thus, if an agency announces and follows a certain
discretionary practice, it must act in accordance with that stated
practice unless it provides a reasoned explanation for changing
course. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983).
In State Farm, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration rescinded a regulation requiring manufacturers
to construct new cars with either passive seatbelts or airbags. Id.
at 35–37. The agency stated that it no longer thought the
regulation would provide significant safety benefits, though
nearly all of the agency's reasoning was based on the inefficacy of
the passive belts. Id. at 38–39. The Court held that the agency is
permitted change position as to what actions are in the public
interest, but that it acted arbitrarily in rescinding a rule
purported to address important safety issues without a reasoned
explanation as to why it no longer thought the rule would
accomplish statutory objectives. Id. at 42–43.
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Similarly, here EPA has failed to provide any explanation for
its decision to apply PSD review to the GHG emissions at the
Sylvanergy biomass facility, which conflicts with numerous
agency statements indicating an intention to exempt biogenic
GHG emissions from the PSD program until EPA can be certain
that there would be a regulatory benefit to controlling such
emissions. Apart from deferring PSD regulation of biogenic
GHGs, EPA also released a guidance document to provide "a
basis for concluding that under the PSD Program the combustion
of biomass fuels can be considered BACT for biogenic CO2
emissions at stationary sources." Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at
43,492. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged the scientific
uncertainty regarding the effect of biogenic CO2 emissions. See
CBD, 722 F.3d at 407. In light of that uncertainty, EPA
reasonably decided to conduct more research before subjecting
biomass facilities to PSD review for GHG emissions, and
acknowledges that there may be no benefit to regulation of
certain biogenic GHGs. See, e.g., Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at
43,492 ("EPA concluded that the issue of accounting for the net
atmospheric impact of biogenic CO2 emissions is complex enough
that further consideration of this important issue is warranted");
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830,
34,924–25 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60) (explaining that "burning biomass-derived fuels for energy
recovery can yield climate benefits as compared to burning
conventional fossil fuels," and announcing that EPA needed to
continue studying the impact of biogenic CO2 emissions in
achieving emission reduction targets). Despite these clear
statements of EPA policy, NUARB impermissibly imposed PSD
requirements on the Forestdale Biomass Facility. Because that
decision represents an unexplained departure from announced
policy, it must be set aside as arbitrary and capricious.
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V. NUARB REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT
WOOD GASIFICATION AND PARTIAL CARBON
CAPTURE AND STORAGE WOULD
IMPERMISSIBLY REDEFINE THE FORESTDALE
BIOMASS FACILITY.
Step one of the "top-down" method6for determining BACT
requires identification of "all 'available' control options. Available
control options are those air pollution control technologies or
techniques . . . that have potential for practical application to the
emissions unit and the regulated pollutant under evaluation."
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION,
GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING BEST AVAILABLE CONTROL
TECHNOLOGY FOR REDUCING CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM
BIOENERGY PRODUCTION 6, 24 (2011) [hereinafter "BACT
GUIDANCE"].In step one of its BACT review, NUARB properly
"rejected the implementation of wood gasification and partial
carbon capture and storage as an impermissible redefinition of
the proposed source." R. 7. The agency's determination reflects
an "important limitation on BACT"—it "cannot be used to order a
fundamental redesign of [a] facility." UARG, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2448
(2014); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 499 F.3d
653, 654-655 (7th Cir. 2007). The CAA requires "the proposed
facility [be] subject to the best available control technology." 42
U.S.C. §7475(a)(4) (2012) (emphasis added). That is, BACT only
applies only to the facility Sylvanergy intends to build. If
redesigns were considered control technologies, it "would stretch
the term 'control technology' beyond the breaking point." Sierra
Club, 499 F.3d at 655.
The EAB has articulated how to determine what changes to a
facility's design would constitute a redefinition of the proposed
source. See, e.g.,In re Desert Rock Energy Company, LLC, 14
E.A.D. 484, 530 (EAB 2009).First, the permit issuer evaluates
how an applicant defines the facility's "end, object, aim or purpose
. . . the facility's basic design." Id. Second, the permit issuer takes
6. The top-down framework is the recommended and “predominant method
for determining BACT.”Clean Air Act Advisory Committee, Interim Phase I
Report of the Climate Change Work Group of the Permits, New Source Review
and
Toxics
Subcommittee16
(2010),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oar/caaac/climate/2010_02_InterimPhaseIReport.pdf.
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a "hard look" at which design components are integral to the
facility's purpose and which can be changed to reduce emissions
"without disrupting the applicant's basic business purpose for the
proposed facility." Id.7 In those instances when it is not readily
apparent "where control technology ends and a redesign of the
'proposed facility' begins," it is proper to defer to a reasonable
agency decision. See Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 656 (If the
distinction "is one of degree . . . the treatment of differences of
degree . . . is entrusted to the judgment of the agency that
administers the regulatory scheme rather than to courts of
generalist judges."). Here, NUARB reasonably determined that
requiring Sylvanergy to gasify wood and burn gas, rather than
burn wood, would fundamentally redefine the Forestdale Biomass
Facility.
Substantial change to a proposed design is a valid reason to
find a control technology impermissibly redefines the proposed
source. See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 226 P.3d 809, 823 (Wyo. 2010). In Powder River
Basin Resource Council, the applicant's proposed facility would
include a "'subcritical' boiler," while petitioners argued for a
"'supercritical' boiler," the difference being a matter of operating
temperatures and pressures. Id. at 821. However, this distinction
still required "a different boiler" with changes in its structure and
components, and therefore would redefine the proposed source.
Id. at 822.
Here, the difference between control technologies is
substantial, and NUARB reasonably found SOC's proposed option
would redefine the design of the Forestdale Biomass Facility.
Sylvanergy proposed to construct a wood pellet fuel production
plant in conjunction with a biomass-fired electricity generation
unit. R. 5. Within biomass-fired units, biomass such as wood
pellets are solid fuel and "[are] burned in a boiler to produce highpressure steam that is used to power a steam turbine-driven
power generator." U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY COMBINED HEAT
7. A permit issuer also evaluates whether the applicant has “intentionally
design[ed] the plant in a way calculated to make measures for limiting the
emission of pollutants ineffectual.” Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 654. However, no
party argues that Sylvanergy proposed a design making potential emissions
limitations ineffectual, and this factor will not be discussed.
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AND POWER P'SHIP, BIOMASS COMBINED HEAT AND POWER
CATALOG OF TECHNOLOGIES30 (2007) [hereinafter "CHP
CATALOG"]. The Forestdale Biomass Facilityis designed to

"consist of an advanced stoker design wood-fired boiler together
with two ULSD start-up burners." R. 5. A stoker boiler "employ[s]
direct fire combustion of solid fuels with excess air, producing hot
flue gases, which then produce[s] steam." CHP CATALOGat 30.
Sylvanergy's proposed design is far removed from the
technology and processes involved in wood gasification. "Biomass
gasification systems operate by heating biomass in an
environment where the solid breaks down to form a flammable
gas. The gas produced—synthetic gas, or syngas—can be cleaned,
filtered, and then burned in a gas turbine." Id. at 26. Rather than
the wood pellets acting as a solid fuel source in direct combustion,
the wood pellets would undergo "several steps" in order for the
actual fuel source, the syngas, to be obtained. See Id.at 45. This
requires technologies such as "fixed bed gasifiers and fluidized
bed gasifiers," specific to the gasification process and beyond
those proposed by Sylvanergy in the record. Id. at 30; see R. 5.
The integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) "is not simply
an add-on emissions control technology, but instead requires a
differently designed power block." Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 530.8
Further, the fact that both control technologies use the same
materials to generate the same product does not undermine the
validity of NUARB's decision. SOC relies on Utah Chapter of
Sierra Club v. Air Quality Board in arguing wood gasification and
partial carbon capture and storage must be considered, as the
"basic design" of the Forestdale Biomass Facility—an electric
power generating plant fueled by wood—would remain
unchanged. See 226 P.3d 719, 733 (Utah 2009) (agency erred in
finding control technology redefined the source because it would
not change the basic design of a proposed facility, an electric
power generating plant fueled by coal). However, the Utah
8. SOC relies on Desert Rock in arguing NUARB improperly rejected wood
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage as BACT. See 14 E.A.D. at
484 (finding agency inappropriately rejected consideration of IGCC as BACT).
However, Desert Rock is distinguishable. The permit applicant in that case had
included IGCC in its definition of the proposed facility; therefore, the agency had
not taken the requisite “hard look”by ignoring this proposal and erred in its
analysis. Id. at 547.
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Chapter of Sierra Clubdecision should not be given significant
weight here, as it is "too simplistic to say that a proposed source
is defined solely by the raw materials it uses and the product it
makes." Powder River Basin, 226 P.3d at 823. A control
technology can redefine a source, even where the raw materials
and end product are unchanged. See id. at 824; Sierra Club, 499
at 654 (transport and changes in facility design led to rejection of
control technology option, despite it using same raw materials to
make same product). Similar to both Powder River Basin and
Sierra Club, the control technology proposed by SOC would
require substantial changes in design to the Forestdale Biomass
Facility by requiring different equipment and more extensive
processes. Therefore, at this stage in the BACT determination, it
was reasonable for NUARB to conclude that wood gasification
and partial carbon capture and storage would redefine the
Forestdale Biomass Facility.
VI. NUARB ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUSTAINABLE FOREST PLAN AS BACT
BECAUSE IT IMPERMISSIBLY CONSIDERED
"BEYOND-THE-FENCE" MEASURES CONTRARY
TO CAA SECTION169(3).
While NUARB reasonably found that wood gasification and
partial carbon capture and storage redefined the source, it
ultimately erred at step one of the BACT determination. The
agency impermissibly considered "beyond-the-fence" measures in
identifying the Sustainable Forest Plan as an available control
option. Congress intended for BACT to be applied onsite, and the
Supreme Court has cautioned against an unheralded expansion
of the requirement in the GHG context.
BACT is defined as:
[A]n emissions limitation . . .which the permitting authority, on a
case-by-case basis . . . determines is achievable for such facility
through application of production processes and available
methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean
fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for
control of each such pollutant.
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42 U.S.C. §7479(3) (2012). This definition does not indicate that a
permit-issuing agency is allowed to consider offsite mitigation
measures or offsets in its BACT determination. Even if this Court
finds section 169(3) ambiguous on its face, an analysis of
corresponding regulations, case law, and other CAA requirements
show that considering "beyond-the-fence" measures is an
impermissible construction of the statute. Because the Supreme
Court has counseled against an expansive BACT requirement,
this Court should find that NUARB operated outside the scope of
the CAA section169(3) when it imposed the Sustainable Forest
Plan. See UARG, 134 S.Ct. at 2447–49.
A. A permit-issuing agency is required to consider
onsite, traditional control technology in its BACT
determination.
Fundamentally, the CAA instructs EPA to apply "best
available controltechnology," 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (emphasis
added), which suggests machinery, equipment, or some other sort
of tangible object or process that physically limits emissions. See
Control Technology, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY QUICK
REFERENCE (Wolters Kluwer 2012) ("Devices, substances, and
processes to control any activity."). An examination of BACT's
definition supports this scope. Although "production processes
and available methods, systems, and techniques" are undefined,
Congress included a subsequent list of examples to illustrate
what control technologies it considered permissible as BACT. See
id.§ 7479(3)."We rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis—a word
is known by the company it keeps—to 'avoid ascribing to [words]
a meaning so broad that [they are] inconsistent with [their]
accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts
of Congress.'" Yates v. U.S., 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (internal
citation omitted). Here, section 169(3) uses "fuel cleaning, clean
fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques." 42
U.S.C. §7479(3). These all refer to traditional technological
processes that, logically and practically speaking, would occur
onsite. While this list is not exclusive, it remains that NUARB's
inclusion of offsite reforestation area management in the BACT
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determination is an attempt to fit a square peg in a round hole.
Indeed, in the preceding petition for review, the EAB
acknowledges an absence of instances where offsite measures
have been required as BACT. R. 11. Instead, cases apply the
traditional, onsite BACT requirement. See, e.g., Alaska Dept. of
Envtl. Conservation v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461
(2004) (determining whether selective catalytic reduction or lowNOxwould establish BACT standard for NOx from diesel electric
generator); Sierra Club v. Wisconsin Dept. of Natural Res., 787
N.W.2d 855 (Wis. App. 2010) (disputing whether BACT for SO2
should be based on wet or dry flue gas desulfurization). This
application of BACT is further supported by EPA guidance, which
"interprets the language of the BACT definition . . . to include
control methods that can be used facility-wide." BACT GUIDANCE
at 23 (emphasis added).
EPA's regulatory definition of BACT also indicates section
169(3)'s scope. Beyond mirroring the statutory definition, the
regulatory definition also provides:
If the reviewing authority determines that technological or
economic limitations on the application of measurement
methodology to a particular emissions unit would make the
imposition of an emissions standard infeasible, a design,
equipment, work practice, operational standard or combination
thereof, may be prescribed instead to satisfy the requirement for
the application of best available control technology.

40 C.F.R. §51.166(b)(12) (2014). These prescriptions have been
referred to as "non-numeric limitations" and are similar to the
management plan NUARB determined as BACT.See, e.g., In re
Indeck-Elwood, 13 E.A.D. 126, 176 (EAB 2006). As indicated by
the regulations, however, non-numeric limitations are only
available if EPA has considered and rejected technological
limitations. See 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(12) (prescribing limitations
only when traditional methods are "infeasible"). While these
regulations do not go as far as suggesting offsite measures can be
considered, they do indicate non-traditional measures should only
be considered as a matter of last resort. Clearly, EPA's
regulations supplement a narrow statutory scope, and the
Sustainable Forest Plan falls outside what the CAA requires for
BACT determinations.
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Finally, any comparison to CAA section111(a)(1) in support of
"beyond-the-fence" measures is misguided, as the corresponding
"best system for emission reduction" (BSER) requirement is
distinguishable from BACT. 42 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1). First, unlike
BACT, which is limited in definition by references to traditional
technological controls, BSER is undefined in the CAA and is open
to broader, albeit reasonable agency interpretation.Second,
legislative history also indicates broader considerations are
permissible for BSER. Similar to BACT, section 111(a)(1) once
referred to the "best technological system;" however, Congress
removed this language in 1990. See Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104. Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671q (2012)); H.R. 3316, 101st Cong., at 12-13 (1989)
(proposing that emissions reductions be achieved through the use
of not only technological systems but also emissions trading and
other methods). More accurately, BSER and BACT are
complementary, yet separate standards between New Source
Performance Standards and PSD review—a relationship that
Congress acknowledged during the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments. See H.R. REP. 95-294, at 166 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1245 (indicating that PSD policy,
alongside BSER requirements under section 111, "will help
strengthen incentives for new plants to use locally available coal
plus best available control technology") (emphasis added).
B. The Supreme Court has cautioned against a
regulatory expansion of BACT analysis.
Even if this Court finds the CAA is ambiguous as to whether
offsite measures can be considered in a BACT determination,
recent concerns raised by the Supreme Court in UARG suggest
this Court should refrain from allowing such novel and expansive
regulatory authority. 134 S.Ct. 2427. Among the issues presented
in UARG, the Supreme Court addressed whether EPA reasonably
interpreted the CAA to require "anyway" sources to comply with
BACT for GHGs. 134 S.Ct. at 2447. Petitioners argued that BACT
fundamentally did not apply, as it "has traditionally been about
end-of-stack controls 'such as catalytic converters or particle
collectors'; but applying it to greenhouse gases will make it more
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about regulating energy use . . . enabl[ing] regulators to control
'every aspect of a facility's operation and design.'" Id. (citation
omitted). While the Court concluded, in that context, there were
proper regulatory restraints that mitigated concerns of
"'unbounded' regulatory authority," it acknowledged
the potential for greenhouse-gas BACT to lead to an
unreasonable and unanticipated degree of regulation, and our
decision should not be taken as an endorsement of all aspects of
EPA's current approach, nor as a free rein for any future
regulatory application of BACT in this distinct context.

Id. at 2448–49. The same concerns for "unbounded regulatory
authority" apply here. By considering offsite mitigation measures
or offsets in determining BACT, NUARB acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. Therefore, this Court must remand the PSD permit
so NUARB can reevaluate its BACT determination.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Sylvanergy respectfully
requests that this Court reverse New Union Air Resources
Board's (NUARB's) denial of Sylvanergy's Non-Applicability
Determination request. In the alternative, this Court should
remand Sylvanergy's Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD) permit to NUARB in recognition of the fact thatthe
Forestdale Biomass Facilityshould not have been subjected to
PSD review for biogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Finally,
if this Court determines that NUARB can regulate biogenic CO 2
emissions under the PSD program, this Court should still remand
the PSD permit and instruct NUARB to only consider onsite
control technologies in its determination of best available control
technology.
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